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     Attorneys for Appellant 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 This diversity case arises out of a contractual dispute 
between Stanley Bazant, a hotel owner, and Otis Elevator Company. 
Intertwined with certain procedural questions is one substantive 
question of Pennsylvania law.  That question concerns the 
construction of a so-called "automatic renewal provision" -- that 
is, a contractual provision pursuant to which a contract for a 
term is renewed automatically for a further term unless, before a 
specified date, one party gives notice of an intent to terminate. 
The district court held that Bazant's late notice of his intent 
to terminate the contract did not suffice to avoid renewal.  On 
appeal, Bazant argues that his late notice ought to have been 
deemed sufficient since Otis did not demonstrate that it would be 
prejudiced by Bazant's tardiness.  Bazant relies on a 
Pennsylvania Superior Court decision -- Music, Inc. v. Henry B. 
Klein Co., 245 A.2d 650 (Pa. Super. 1968) -- which appears to be 
the only Pennsylvania appellate case directly addressing the 
question.  In Music, the Superior Court was sharply divided. 
Since Music, and prior to the case at bar, the question has been 
addressed on at least three occasions by district judges in this 
circuit, and Music has received mixed reviews.  We conclude that 
in the case at bar the district court correctly declined to 
follow the prevailing opinion in Music -- an opinion which we 
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think is not likely to be followed by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. 
 Part I of this opinion describes the background and 
procedural history of this case.  Part II analyzes the issues 
raised by Bazant's appeal. 
  
I. 
 Otis Elevator Company ("Otis") entered into an elevator 
maintenance and service contract with the George Washington Hotel 
Corporation on December 12, 1980.  The contract provided for 
service from January 1, 1981 until December 31, 1990 at the 
George Washington Hotel in Washington, Pennsylvania.  The 
contract also provided that the contract would be renewed 
automatically for a five-year term unless a party gave notice of 
an intent to terminate at least ninety days before the end of the 
contract term: 
 
Either party may terminate this agreement at the end of the 
extended contract term selected above or at the end of any 
subsequent five year period by giving the other party 90 
days prior written notice. 
 
 Stanley Bazant ("Bazant") is the successor in interest to 
the George Washington Hotel Corporation and is the only remaining 
defendant in this case.  On November 30, 1990 -- thirty-one days 
before the end of the extended contract term -- Robert Bazant, 
Stanley Bazant's son and the Hotel's controller, sent a letter to 
Otis stating an intent to terminate the contract as of December 
31, 1990.  On December 6, 1990, a representative of Otis 
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responded by letter.  In Otis' view, the contract had already 
been automatically renewed for a five-year term. 
 Stanley Bazant disagreed with Otis' position that automatic 
renewal had occurred.  In addition, Bazant withheld payments for 
the last three months of the contract term (October through 
December, 1990).  According to Bazant, he withheld payments 
because of problems with Otis' service. 
 Otis filed the instant action in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on November 15, 
1991.  On January 2, 1992, Otis filed an amended complaint 
alleging two counts against Bazant:  (1) count II, seeking 
damages from Bazant for breach of contract based on Bazant's 
failure to pay Otis the monthly contract price for the months of 
October through December, 1990; and (2) count IV, seeking damages 
from Bazant based on Bazant's failure to honor the renewed 
contract term. 
 On February 6, 1992, Bazant filed an answer to the amended 
complaint that contained a counterclaim.  The counterclaim 
alleged that Otis had failed to follow through on a commitment to 
give Bazant a twenty-percent discount. 
 On July 21, 1992, Bazant moved for partial summary judgment. 
Bazant argued in that motion that he was entitled to 
summary judgment on count IV of Otis' complaint because Robert 
Bazant's November 30, 1990 letter terminated the contract with 
Otis.  Otis filed a response to Bazant's motion, but did not file 
a cross-motion for summary judgment on count IV. 
5 
 On August 24, 1992, Otis moved for summary judgment on 
Bazant's counterclaim.  Bazant did not file a response. 
 In an opinion dated October 9, 1992, the district court 
denied Bazant's motion for summary judgment on count IV and, 
acting sua sponte, granted summary judgment to Otis on count IV. 
The district court also granted Otis' motion for summary judgment 
on Bazant's counterclaim. 
 Up to that point in the proceedings, Bazant's only 
substantive defense to Otis' count IV claim had been that, under 
the terms of the contract and the applicable Pennsylvania case 
law, Robert Bazant's letter of termination sufficed to avoid 
automatic renewal.  Five months after the district court granted 
summary judgment in Otis' favor on count IV, Bazant filed a 
motion to amend his answer to the amended complaint to include 
the contention that termination was justified due to Otis' 
substantial non-performance of its contractual duties.  By order 
dated March 17, 1993, the district court granted Bazant's motion 
to file an amended answer. 
 At a pre-trial conference on August 4, 1993, Bazant voiced 
an objection to the district court's proposed jury instructions: 
Bazant complained that the proposed instructions directed the 
jury that Bazant's liability with respect to count IV had already 
been determined, and that the only issue for the jury with 
respect to that count was the measure of damages.  Bazant 
protested that the proposed instructions did not allow him to 
raise non-performance as a defense to liability under count IV; 
he was only allowed to raise non-performance as a defense to 
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liability under count II, the count seeking damages for Bazant's 
non-payment for services rendered by Otis in October through 
December of 1990.  Bazant argued that, by allowing him to amend 
his answer, the district court had reopened the issue of Bazant's 
liability under count IV, notwithstanding the October 9, 1992 
order granting summary judgment on that count.  The district 
court disagreed.  The district court regarded the issue of 
liability with respect to count IV as decided by its October 9, 
1992 order, and concluded that Bazant could assert non-
performance only as a defense to liability under count II. 
 At trial, on August 5, 1993, Bazant sought to testify about 
two events relevant to his claim that he was entitled to a 
twenty-percent discount.  At side-bar, Bazant made the following 
proffer.  Bazant said that, if allowed to testify, he would say 
that he telephoned Otis in October 1990 and asked to speak to an 
Otis representative regarding the Hotel's account.  His call was 
directed to someone identified as Mr. Mahoney who stated that the 
Hotel would be given a twenty-percent discount if it agreed to 
the five-year renewal term.  The district court excluded the 
testimony on the ground that Bazant had not come forward with 
evidence that the person identified as Mahoney had authority to 
make admissions for Otis.  Bazant was permitted to testify that, 
at a meeting in December 1990, Otis' account representative for 
the Hotel, Peter Volmer, reiterated this twenty-percent discount 
offer.  The district court, however, later concluded that this 
testimony could not support a jury verdict for Bazant on the 
counterclaim and directed a verdict in Otis' favor on the 
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counterclaim.  The district court reasoned that, because the 
December 1990 meeting occurred after the ninety-day deadline for 
providing notice of termination, the contract had already been 
renewed and thus there was no consideration to support a promise 
to give a twenty-percent discount. 
 The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Otis and against 
Bazant, in the amount of $4,000 for the months of October, 
November and December of 1990 (count II), and $33,194 for the 
five-year renewal period (count IV).  
 On appeal, Bazant challenges the rulings of the district 
court:  (1) denying Bazant's motion for summary judgment on count 
IV; (2) granting summary judgment, sua sponte, in Otis' favor on 
count IV, and instructing the jury that Bazant's liability had 
been established with respect to that count; and (3) excluding 
evidence relevant to Bazant's counterclaim and directing a 
verdict in Otis' favor on the counterclaim. 
 
II. 
A. The denial of Bazant's motion for summary judgment 
 on count IV 
 In his motion for summary judgment on count IV, Bazant 
argued that his son's November 30, 1990 letter stating the 
Hotel's intention to terminate the contract with Otis sufficed to 
avoid automatic renewal.  To support his position, Bazant relied 
upon Music, Inc. v. Henry B. Klein Co., 245 A.2d 650 (Pa. Super. 
1968).  In Music, the prevailing opinion in the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court observed that the automatic renewal provision at 
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issue did not contain a "time is of the essence" clause.  After 
making this observation, the Music court refused to enforce the 
automatic renewal provision because the plaintiff had not shown 
that it was prejudiced by the late notice.  The district court in 
the present case declined to follow Music and instead endorsed 
the approach taken in Sungard Services Co. v. Joint Computer 
Center, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4449, No. 88-8367 (E.D. Pa. April 
26, 1989).  In Sungard Services v. Joint Computer, Judge Newcomer 
enforced an automatic renewal provision that did not contain a 
"time is of the essence" clause without requiring a showing of 
prejudice.  Accordingly, in the case at bar, the district court 
concluded that Bazant's untimely notice was not effective to 
terminate the contract and denied Bazant's motion for summary 
judgment.  On appeal, Bazant challenges the district court's 
unwillingness to follow Music. 
 The contract at issue in Music provided for automatic 
renewal for a second term of nearly four years unless a party 
gave written notice of termination sixty days before the end of 
the term.  The defendant mailed such notice sixty-one days before 
the end of the contract term; the notice was received fifty-eight 
days before the end of the term.  The sole question raised on 
appeal was whether effective termination notice was given 
pursuant to the terms of the contract and the intent of the 
parties.  Judge Spaulding, joined by Judges Wright and Jacobs,2 
                                                           
2Judge Montgomery concurred in the result.  Judge Hoffman filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Judge Watkins joined.  Judge Hannum 
did not participate in the disposition of the case. 
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first noted that "[t]here was no specific provision in the 
contract making time of the essence and no circumstances have 
been demonstrated which clearly indicate that both parties 
intended that time should be of the essence."  Music, 245 A.2d at 
651.  The Superior Court next observed that "[s]everal other 
courts have applied a rule of construction which permits a 
finding that a termination is sufficient even though delivered 
later than the period specified in the contract when the 
terminating party acted reasonably under the circumstances and 
there is no demonstrable prejudice resulting from the delayed 
notice."  Id. at 652.  The Music court concluded that, "[a]bsent 
a showing that appellant was damaged in any way by receipt of the 
termination notice on October 3rd, or that he changed his 
position to his detriment, it would be unconscionable to hold 
appellee to an additional contract of three years and eight 
months."  Id.   
 In dissent, Judge Hoffman argued that "[t]his holding 
disregards the clear meaning of the contract and the intent of 
the parties."  Id. at 653.  Judge Hoffman reasoned that the time 
limitation was included for the benefit of both parties, and 
contended that "[t]o allow the defendant to expand the time 
limitation, in and of itself reasonable, by an additional 
reasonable period of time would give it something for which it 
did not bargain."  Id.  Because the requirement of the automatic 
renewal clause was "clear and unequivocal," Judge Hoffman 
concluded that no "time is of the essence" clause should be 
required, and that the contract should be enforced as written. 
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Id.  Judge Hoffman recognized that the law will infer that time 
is not of the essence in order to avoid a severe penalty or 
forfeiture. See id. (citing 5 A. Corbin, Contracts, § 1177 
(1964)).  However, Judge Hoffman explained: 
 
[N]o forfeiture or penalty results here if it is held that 
the termination notice as given is ineffective.  The 
defendant would still be entitled in the future to whatever 
benefits were conferred upon him by the contract.  While 
defendant may have determined that these benefits were of 
little or no value to him, he can no more seek to avoid the 
clear obligations of the second term of his contract than if 
he had discovered this fact immediately after the 
commencement of the initial term of the contract. 
 
Id. 
 Two district judges have followed the approach taken by 
Judge Spaulding for the plurality in Music.  The contract in 
Eastern Milk Producers Cooperative Assoc. v. Lehigh Valley 
Cooperative Farmers, 568 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1993), contained 
an automatic renewal provision that required sixty-days notice to 
avoid renewal for another year.  Judge Troutman noted that, as in 
Music, the contract contained no "time is of the essence" clause. 
See id. at 1209.  However, Judge Troutman concluded that the 
plaintiff had made an unrebutted showing that it was damaged by 
the forced sale of large volumes of milk at distress prices.  See 
id.  For this reason, Judge Troutman held that the untimely 
notice was not effective. 
 In Schindler Haughton Elevator Corp. v. The America College, 
Slip Opinion, No. 85-2577 (E.D. Pa. February 11, 1986), then 
District Judge Scirica addressed the question of the 
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enforceability of an automatic renewal provision.  Judge Scirica 
explained that, "[u]nder Music, such untimely notice is 
effective, provided 'the terminating party acted reasonably under 
the circumstances and there is not demonstrable prejudice 
resulting from the delayed notice.'  These issues of 
reasonableness and prejudice are questions of fact to be 
determined at trial."  (citations to Music and Eastern Milk 
omitted). 
 In contrast, Judge Newcomer declined to follow Music in 
Sungard Services v. Joint Computer.  Judge Newcomer explained 
that "two sophisticated business entities," Sungard and JCC, had 
a written contract with a "clear and unambiguous automatic 
renewal provision" that required six months notice to avoid a new 
two-year term.  Three and one-half months before the end of the 
term, JCC gave notice to Sungard of its wish to terminate the 
contract and refused to make payments for the next term.  Judge 
Newcomer first observed: 
 
As a result of this breach, Sungard suffered damages by 
being deprived of revenue that it would have received 
through the remainder of the contract period.  At the risk 
of stating the obvious, this revenue would serve as a source 
of funds by which Sungard could meet its contractual 
obligations to entities supplying it with goods and services 
and would also provide profit to Sungard.  Clearly, then, 
the loss of such revenue harmed Sungard. 
 
Id. at *9.  After making this observation, Judge Newcomer 
reviewed the facts and holdings of Music, Eastern Milk, 
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Schindler, and Sungard Services Co. v. Wang Laboratories, Inc., 
No. 87-3150 (E.D. Pa. April 5, 1988).3  
 Based on his review of the applicable Pennsylvania case law, 
Judge Newcomer concluded that the automatic renewal provision at 
issue was not, in and of itself, unconscionable.  Judge Newcomer 
stated:   
 
To the extent that the court's holding conflicts with the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court's holding in Music, I 
respectfully disagree with that court.  I note, however, 
that the facts of the instant case are distinguishable from 
those in Music, as Music involved a notice of termination 
mailed prior to the time required and received only two days 
after the deadline for advance termination of the contract.  
 
Id. at *14. 
  In the case at bar, the district court enforced the 
automatic renewal provision and held that Bazant's late notice of 
termination was ineffective.  The court first undertook to 
distinguish Music:  "Bazant's reliance on Music . . . is 
misplaced.  Music involved a notice of termination mailed prior 
                                                           
3In Sungard Services Co. v. Wayne Laboratories, Inc., No. 87-3150 
(E.D. Pa. April 5, 1988), an automatic renewal provision required 
six-months notice to avoid renewal for an additional two year 
term.  Judge Bechtle held that, in light of the defendant's 
untimely termination notice, the contract was automatically 
renewed.  Judge Bechtle did not require a showing of prejudice; 
however, this omission probably did not reflect a decision by 
Judge Bechtle not to follow Music.  It appears from Judge 
Bechtle's opinion, delivered from the bench, that the defendant 
did not argue that the plaintiff had to show prejudice or 
otherwise call Music to the attention of the district court. 
Indeed, the defendant apparently conceded that its late notice 
was ineffective under the automatic renewal clause, and argued 
instead that it had terminated the contract under a separate 
provision allowing termination on ninety days notice if certain 
conditions were satisfied.  See Bench Opinion, at 17. 
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to the time required and received only two days after the 
deadline for advanced termination of the contract.  The instant 
case involves notice of termination which was dated (and 
presumably mailed) 58 days after the required date for advanced 
termination."  Opinion, at 6-7 (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original).  The court next undertook to draw an analogy to 
Eastern Milk:  "The automatic renewal provision in [Eastern Milk] 
was upheld in the absence of a 'time of the essence' clause, 
because the Court found that there had been a showing of 
prejudice as a result of the late notice.  The instant case is no 
different."  Opinion, at 7.  The court explained that, just as in 
Sungard Services v. Joint Computer, the damage in the instant 
case is obvious: 
 
"[The plaintiff] suffer[s] damages by being deprived of 
revenue that it would have received through the remainder of 
the contract period. . . .  [T]his revenue would serve as a 
source of funds by which [the plaintiff] could meet its 
contractual obligations to entities supplying it with goods 
and services and would also provide profit to [the 
plaintiff].  Clearly, then, the loss of revenue harmed [the 
plaintiff]." 
 
Opinion at 7 (quoting Sungard Services v. Joint Computer). 
Finally, the district court concluded that because the automatic 
renewal provision is clear and unambiguous, it would be enforced. 
The court indicated that it was adopting "the cogent perspective 
set forth by Judge Newcomer in [Sungard Services] v. Joint 
Computer."  Opinion, at 9. 
 We do not concur in the district court's conclusion that, 
even under the approach taken in Eastern Milk (building on the 
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plurality opinion in Music), Otis made a showing of prejudice 
sufficient to justify enforcement of the automatic renewal 
provision.  The case at bar is not like Eastern Milk in this 
respect.  In Eastern Milk, there was evidence that the plaintiff 
was harmed by the lateness of the notice -- the plaintiff was 
forced to sell large volumes of milk at distress prices.  In 
contrast, the harm to the plaintiff in the present case is harm 
caused by the breach of contract, not harm caused by the late 
notice.  That is, even if the notice had been timely, Otis would 
have suffered the same harm (loss of profits expected under the 
contract).  This type of harm cannot be characterized as 
prejudice in the sense used by the Eastern Milk and Music courts. 
 We are persuaded, however, by the district court's 
decision to enforce the automatic renewal provision without 
requiring a showing of prejudice -- that is, by the district 
court's rejection of Music in favor of the approach taken by 
Judge Newcomer in Sungard Services v. Joint Computer.  We do not 
believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, if it has occasion 
to address this issue, will acquiesce in the rationale adopted by 
the plurality opinion in Music.  Instead, we conclude that the 
analysis pursued by Judge Hoffman in his dissent is confirmed by 
the reasoning of Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co., 371 A.2d 193 
(Pa. 1977), decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nine years 
after the Superior Court's decision in Music.   
 Brakeman involved an automobile insurance policy that 
required, as a condition of coverage, that the insured give 
notice of an accident "as soon as practicable."  Prior to 
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Brakeman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that untimely 
notice releases an insurer from its obligation to pay, regardless 
of whether the insurer was prejudiced by the delay.  In Brakeman, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled its prior decisions to 
this effect and announced that an insurer would have to show that 
it was prejudiced by the delay.  The court explained that "[t]he 
rationale underlying the strict contractual approach reflected in 
our past decisions is that courts should not presume to interfere 
with the freedom of private contracts and redraft insurance 
policy provisions where the intent of the parties is expressed by 
clear and unambiguous language."  Id. at 196.   
 The Brakeman court gave two reasons for departing from a 
strict contractual approach.  First, the court explained that the 
only aspect of an insurance contract over which an insured can 
bargain is the amount of coverage.  See id. at 196.  The court 
noted that an automobile is a virtual necessity, that liability 
insurance coverage is required by state law, and that insurance 
policies uniformly include provisions requiring notice "as soon 
as practicable."  See id. at 196 & n.6.  Second, the court 
explained: 
 A strict contractual approach is also inappropriate here 
because what we are concerned with is a forfeiture.  The 
insurance company in the instant case accepted the premiums 
paid by the insured for insurance coverage and now seeks to 
deny that coverage on the ground of late notice. 
 
Id. at 197.  See also id. at 198 ("Allowing an insurance company, 
which has collected full premiums or coverage, to refuse 
compensation to an accident victim or insured on the ground of 
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late notice, where it is not shown timely notice would have put 
the company in a more favorable position, is severe and 
inequitable."). 
 The reasons given in Brakeman for departing from a strict 
contractual approach do not justify requiring a showing of 
prejudice to enforce the automatic renewal provision in the case 
at bar.  First, although the automatic renewal provision appears 
in Otis' standard form contract, there is no indication that 
Bazant lacked the power to bargain over the contractual terms. 
Indeed, Bazant's contention in his counterclaim that he had 
negotiated a twenty-percent discount is incompatible with the 
notion that Bazant lacked significant bargaining power.  Second, 
enforcement of the automatic renewal provision does not result in 
a forfeiture.  Although -- assuming enforcement of the provision 
-- Bazant would be obligated by the automatic renewal of the 
contract to continue to make payments to Otis, Otis would be 
correspondingly obligated to continue to maintain and provide 
service for the Hotel's elevators.  Because the reasons given in 
Brakeman for departing from a strict contractual approach do not 
apply, we conclude that the district court correctly held that 
Bazant's untimely notice did not enable him to avoid a new five-
year term.  Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of 
Bazant's motion for summary judgment on count IV. 
 
 
B. The sua sponte grant of summary judgment in favor of Otis  
 on count IV 
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 The district court not only denied Bazant's motion for 
summary judgment with respect to count IV, it granted summary 
judgment for Otis with respect to that count, sua sponte.   
Bazant argues on appeal that the district court improperly 
granted Otis summary judgment sua sponte, because the court did 
not give Bazant notice of its intent to do so or an opportunity 
to oppose summary judgment. 
 The district court's decision to grant Otis summary judgment 
on count IV sua sponte was understandable given the state of the 
record.  The only defense Bazant had raised in his answer to the 
amended complaint was that the November 30, 1990 letter sufficed 
to terminate the contract.  Bazant moved for summary judgment on 
count IV, arguing that there was no disputed issue of material 
fact.  Accordingly, after the district court concluded that 
Bazant was incorrect on the legal issue -- that is, after 
determining that Robert Bazant's notice was ineffective -- the 
district court entered summary judgment for Otis.  Although the 
district court's decision was understandable, it nonetheless 
constituted error under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
 Under our cases, a district court may not grant summary 
judgment sua sponte unless the court gives notice and an 
opportunity to oppose summary judgment.  See Davis Elliott 
Intern. v. Pan American Container, 705 F.2d 705, 707-08 (3d Cir. 
1983) ("'[b]ecause the procedure of Rule 56 requiring an 
opportunity to present pertinent material, which presumes notice 
to the party so that he may take advantage of the opportunity, 
18 
was not followed, the entry of judgment must be reversed'") 
(quoting Bryson v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 621 F.2d 556, 559 (3d 
Cir. 1980)).  See also Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 
F.2d 1064, 1069-70 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[I]n the absence of a formal 
motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was under no formal 
compulsion to marshall all of the evidence in support of his 
claims").   
 The district court could have cured its error by allowing 
Bazant to reopen the issue of his liability under count IV, but 
did not do so.  Five months after the court sua sponte granted 
Otis summary judgment on count IV, Bazant moved to amend his 
answer to the amended complaint to add, as a defense, the 
allegation that Otis's substantial non-performance of its 
contract was cause for termination.  It is apparent from this 
motion that Bazant wanted to assert non-performance as a defense 
against liability with respect to both count II and count IV --
not with respect to count II only.  For example, paragraph 13 of 
the motion recites:  "The bulk of evidence of such non-
performance has already been submitted with respect to Count II 
and allowance of evidence with respect to Count IV would not 
materially prolong the arbitration which is set to continue on 
March 5, 1993."  (A.78).  The district court granted Bazant's 
motion to amend on March 17, 1993.   
 At a pre-trial conference on August 4, 1993, Bazant 
protested that the proposed jury charge instructed the jury that 
Bazant's liability under count IV had been determined as a matter 
of law and that the jury's role was simply to determine damages. 
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Bazant reminded the district court that, after summary judgment 
was granted for Otis on count IV, the district court gave Bazant 
leave to amend his answer to add the non-performance defense. The 
district court responded:  "Well, once we enter summary judgment, 
it doesn't matter what you do in way of amending your answer."  
(A.119).  The district court noted that it saw nothing in the 
"opinion [granting leave to amend] that talks about any counts," 
(A.120) and concluded that "liability [with respect to Count 
[IV]] had already been established, and so that your amendment 
has nothing to do with Count [IV]."  (A.122).   
 It is arguable that the district court's decision to 
instruct the jury that Bazant's liability was established with 
respect to count IV was inconsistent with the district court's 
decision to grant Bazant's motion for leave to file an amended 
answer.  We need not, however, address this possible 
inconsistency.  Because the district court erroneously granted 
summary judgment in Otis' favor sua sponte and without giving 
Bazant notice and an opportunity to oppose summary judgment, and 
did not cure this error by allowing Bazant to reopen the issue of 
his liability under count IV, we vacate the order granting Otis 
summary judgment sua sponte on count IV.  Our ruling is not to be 
taken as a direction to the district court to allow Bazant to 
raise non-performance as a defense to count IV liability. Whether 
Bazant is now entitled to raise that defense and whether that 
defense is substantively cognizable, are, at this point, 
questions for the district court to consider. 
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C.   The order directing a verdict in favor of Otis on   
 Bazant's counterclaim 
 
 As explained above, Bazant brought a counterclaim asserting 
that Otis breached an agreement to give the Hotel a twenty-
percent discount.  In the October 9, 1992 opinion, the district 
court granted Otis' motion for summary judgment on the 
counterclaim for two reasons.  "First, and foremost, defendant 
Bazant failed to reply to this motion [for summary judgment]," 
although he had been given two extensions of time within which to 
file his brief in opposition.  Opinion, at 4.  Second, there was 
no evidence in the record to support Bazant's assertion that he 
was entitled to a twenty-percent discount.  Opinion, at 4-5.  
 Bazant argues on appeal that, at trial, the court erred by 
refusing to allow the jury to consider evidence offered to 
support his counterclaim -- namely, the evidence of his 
conversations with Peter Volmer and the person identified as Mr. 
Mahoney -- and by directing a verdict for Otis on the 
counterclaim.  We need not, however, consider the court's 
specific evidentiary rulings.  Having already determined that 
summary judgment in Otis' favor was warranted by virtue of 
Bazant's failure to oppose the summary judgment motion, the court 
was under no obligation to let the counterclaim go to the jury. 
For this reason, we affirm the district court's order directing a 




 For the foregoing reasons:  (1) the denial of Bazant's 
motion for summary judgment on count IV of Otis' complaint is 
affirmed; (2) the sua sponte grant of summary judgment in Otis' 
favor on count IV is vacated; and (3) the order directing a 
verdict for Otis on the counterclaim is affirmed.  The case is 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
